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Chapter 1 
1. This collection of papers was the outcome of  a major study of  the issue sponsored by 
the Ford Foundation. See, especially Edwards’s summary (1974, p. 29).  Logically, the 
analysis should center on the labor intensity of  exportables relative to import-competing 
goods unless the fraction of income spent on home goods changes with the type of  trade 
regime. 
2.  These two companion volumes provide a synthesis of the results of that project. See 
also Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1970). 
3.  See also the series of  studies done by  the  OECD. The synthesis volume,  which 
contains references to the individual studies, is Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1970). 
4.  That there has been implicit subsidization  of  capital goods imports has long been 
recognized. Hobever, there have been very few attempts to qualify or estimate the inpor- 
tance of these subsidies and their effects on choice of techniques in developing countries. 
Two interesting exceptions are: McCabe and Michalopoulos (1971) and Ongut (1970). See 
chapters 7 and 8 of  this volume for further discussion. 
5.  These conclusions emerge from the NBER project. An initial version is presented in 
Bhagwati and Krueger (1973). A more complete statement is contained in Krueger (1978). 
Chapter 2 
1. See also T. Paul Schultz’s pathbreaking  paper in the second volume of  this series 
(Schultz 1982). Schultz’s work is the first systematic analysis of  the link between rates of 
effective protection  and earnings structure in a developing country. 
2.  There are two sets of  models that posit an upper bound on the number of “produc- 
tive” jobs that can be created. The first is the “technological” explanation, first set forth by 
Eckaus (1955). According to that view, the laborlcapital endowment in the industrial sector 
of developing countries exceeds the maximum technologically feasible ratio. The alterna- 
tive is the “two-gap” model, in which a foreign exchange or savings limit prevents further 
expansion in real output. The model is associated with Hollis B. Chenery and Michael 
Bruno. See section 2.2.1 for further discussion. 
3.  See section 2.2 for a definition of  the “formal”  and “informal”  markets. 
4.  As will be seen in chapter 5, authors who were able to  obtain data on labor coefficients 
for agricultural activities generally found that export-oriented activities in that sector were 
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consistent with greater labor utilization. However, labor coefficients for agriculture are 
averages, and there is reason to believe that there may be significant divergences between 
marginal and average coefficients in the agricultural sectors of  many of  the project coun- 
tries. Since the question underlying the project is  the implications of  a switch in trade 
strategies that would imply resource reallocation (with marginal, not average, coefficients 
predominating), the agricultural coefficients  were viewed with suspicion. There is less basis 
for believing that marginal and average differ in the industrial  sector than in the rural sector. 
5. For an analysis of the role of skills and determinants  of the wage structure, see section 
2.3.3. 
6.  Although it is not empirically important for purposes of  analyzing the relationship 
between trade strategies and employment, it is even possible that in a neoclassical labor 
market an upward shift in the demand for labor could result in decreased employment (if the 
labor supply curve were backward bending). 
7.  See Sen (1975) for a fuller discussion of  ways the labor supply to the urban sector 
might be perfectly elastic. 
8. For a model of growth and employment in a dual economy, see Jorgenson (1961) and 
Ranis and Fei (1961). 
9. A market is said to be more fragmented the less changes in one part of  the market 
affect other parts. If labor is perfectly immobile between two areas, those markets are 
entirely fragmented. 
10. For a recent treatment of short-term macroeconomic  policy in developing countries, 
see Behrman and Hanson (1979). 
11. See especially Behrman (1982). 
12. For a recent treatment of macroeconomic aspects of development, see the collection 
in Blitzer, Clark, and Taylor (1975), which focuses upon input-output models and supply 
constraints. Nowhere is attention given to aggregate demand. 
13. Not all developing countries’ labor markets are so regarded among the countries 
covered here. Hong Kong, Pakistan, and South Korea were generally thought to have 
well-functioning labor markets in the neoclassical sense. 
14. Som,e believe that the differential may reflect only skill differentials, differences in 
living costs, and a premium to induce additional migrants as needed. If that were the case it 
would not constitute a distortion, and the labor market could be regarded as neoclassical. 
15.  In particular, migrants might be risk averse, in which case expected urban income 
could be above rural income at equilibrium. 
16.  Several extensions of  the model have been made that endogenize the urban wage. 
Calvo (1978) developed a model of  maximizing trade union behavior that endogenized the 
urbadrural wage differential. See also Stiglitz (1974). 
17. For an exposition of  the model in an open-economy setting see Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1974). 
18. For a fuller discussion  of the question whether there is “disguised unemployment” in 
rural areas, see Sen (1975, chap. 3). There is also a problem of  “balancing” growth to 
maintain approximately constant terms of  trade between agriculture and industry. But 
opportunities to trade on the international market can obviate the need for balance in that 
sense. 
19. We saw in connection with table 2.1 that in some Latin American countries the 
agricultural labor force is already fairly small, but that the problem of  finding productive 
urban employment opportunities is a key issue. 
20.  In contrast to rural labor markets, for which  an important question is  whether 
unemployment or underemployment exists other than in the sense of  low productivity, 
there is little dispute that urban unemployment 3 la Harris-Todaro is a significant phe- 
nomenon in a number of  countries. Although there are important questions about the 
reliability of unemployment measures, who the unemployed are, and the causes of  unem- 
ployment, these questions did not arise in a central way for purposes of analyzing the trade 
strategies-employment relationship. They are therefore not covered here. 191  Notes to Pages 23-33 
21.  For a careful analysis for one country, see Nelson, Schultz, and Slighton (1971) on 
22.  Argentine data are often presented below. There is also evidence of  an informal 
23.  See table 6.6 for illustrative data on Pakistan. 
24.  See chapter 4 for a definition. 
25.  If  exports or import-competing goods originated in firms with above-average pro- 
26.  Inducements to use capital-intensive techniques can also lead to a nonoptimal choice 
27.  Nabli estimates an elasticity of  .09  for the period 1961-71 for manufacturing estab- 
28. The situation in Pakistan changed in the early 1970s. 
29.  See Calvo (1978). 
30.  Many believe that urban living costs exceed rural living costs by a margin sufficient to 
explain much of  the observed wage differential between unskilled urban and rural earners. 
There is also a school of  thought that alleges that better-paid workers are more productive. 
On this see Mirrlees (1975). 
31.  The term “human capital” was developed to indicate that investments in man are as 
important as investments in machines and other physical capital goods in the development 
process.  See Becker (1975). 
32.  See Schultz (1982) for the estimation of an earnings function based on Colombian 
data. For analyses of  the links between ability and human capital variables in earnings 
functions see Griliches (1972) and Behrman et al. (1979). 
33.  For a review of estimates of  rates of  return to human capital in developing countries, 
see Psacharopoulos  (1973). 
Colombia. 
sector in Argentina. 
ductivity within each industry within the modern sector, the bias might be upward. 
of  techniques or mix of  industries. That topic is covered in chapter 7. 
lishments excluding food processing and handicrafts. 
Chapter 3 
1. There is a range of  commodities whose allocation to export or import categories is 
ambiguous,  and the precept  that is simple in theory is not so readily  implemented  in 
practice.  See chapter 5 below  for  a  discussion of  the  allocation  of  commodities  and 
industries to trade categories on the basis of  the conceptual framework of  chapter 4. 
2.  In the presence of  such distortions, shadow prices can be used to estimate DMRTs. 
Estimation  itself  is difficult empirically, though  it is conceptually  straightforward.  See 
Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1978) for a discussion. 
3.  There are of course a number of  problems in estimating E empirically. With many 
commodities, weights must be used  to form aggregate p’s and q’s. Sometimes the same 
commodity is sold  at different  prices in the  domestic market  and abroad. Also,  price 
comparisons, not tariff rates, are the appropriate bases for estimating E. 
4. To  be sure, governments  can and do provide rebates to compensate  for the cost 
differential between domestic and imported goods. In some instances these are automatic 
and may offset the export disincentives. More often, however, the incentives to overstate 
actual usage in order to get bigger rebates lead the authorities to institute fairly careful 
checks that are time-consuming and constitute a disincentive to exports. 
5.  See Diaz-Alejandro  (1965) for an analysis of  this phenomenon. 
6. A number of  countries have taxed a major raw material export while encouraging 
import substitution, but that further increases the bias toward import-competing industries. 
7. All countries have policies they term “export promotion.”  In many instances, how- 
ever, examination of  incentives reveals that the promotion  measures are really nothing 
more than partial offsets to the discrimination  exports would otherwise face in light of 
exchange rate overvaluation and the high domestic prices confronting exporters. What is 
meant by genuine export promotion in this context is a trade strategy in which, on balance, 
incentives are not tipped toward import substitution. This might be because a country’s 192  Notes to Pages 33-46 
policies were  very  close  to free  trade or because  incentives  for  exporting equaled or 
exceeded those for selling in the domestic market. 
8.  The  effective rate of protection for a given activity is the rate of protection to domestic 
value added in that activity. If  ti is the nominal tariff (or tariff equivalent) on the jth input to 
industry i, then E,, the ERP for industry i, is 
where a,, is the input of j at international prices per dollar (at international prices) of  output 
of  i. 
9.  ERP estimates are difficult to make, and data are not available for the countries 
covered in the project other than for the years indicated (except in cases where alternative 
sources provide noncomparable estimates). See table 3.2, where an indication is given of 
how trade strategies altered within individual countries over time. 
10. See the description of  Chile’s protective structure in Behrman (1976, p. 144). 
11. This discussion draws heavily on the findings of the NBER project on foreign trade 
regimes and economic development. See Bhagwati (1978) for a full analysis of  these issues. 
12.  In some cases, such as Argentina and Indonesia, “official prices” or “check prices” 
are established for some commodities, and tariffs are payable on the official price rather 
than the actual price of  the import. This can make straightforward reliance upon the tariff 
schedule highly misleading if  the former is higher. 
13. To  be sure, a sufficiently high rate of protection through tariffs can achieve the same 
result. This has been the case in Argentina and Uruguay, where tariff levels have been set so 
high that the domestic price exceeded the international price by less than the tariff rate 
(“water” in the tariff). 
14. Capital  goods imports  are generally  permitted  at low rates of  duty. When  the 
exchange rate is overvalued, this can result in a substantial incentive for favored industries 
to use relatively  capital-intensive  techniques.  See chapter 7 for an analysis of  this phe- 
nomenon in the project countries. 
15. Qualifications to this statement are necessary because the presence of  a uniform 
export subsidy rate does not imply equal incentives to exports when the ratio of value added 
to output varies across sectors: sectors with high ratios of  imported inputs are implicitly 
subject to a higher rate of  incentive than are those with a low ratio of imported inputs if  the 
subsidy per dollar of exports is the same and imported inputs are permitted at a lower price 
of  foreign exchange. 
16. Variance can arise chiefly if  different activities have very different value added 
output ratios, with export incentives based on value of  output. 
17.  Credit availability at low or negative real rate of interest can provide incentives for 
exporters to use overly capital-intensive techniques. See chapters 7 and 8. 
18. Export-oriented regimes  often  establish export  promotion  agencies  to facilitate 
marketing and give favored treatment to successful exporters in all government dealings. 
There is also the intangible-but  sometimes very important-value  of  the government 
commitment that exporting will continue to be profitable. 
19.  See the large literature on growth-rate determinants among developed countries, in 
particular Denison (1967) and Christensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1980). Robinson 
(1971) surveyed the available evidence for developing countries. 
20.  Heller and Porter (1978) later contended that Michaely should have computed the 
growth rate of  GNP net of  exports for his test. They reestimated his relations on that basis 
and found that they still held.  They also reinforced  Michaely’s earlier finding that the 
relationship between changing export share and growth is much stronger among higher- 
income developing countries than it is among low-income developing countries. 
21.  Data from Hong Kong are used  where pertinent  in later chapters.  Hong Kong 
appears to conform very closely to free trade, with virtually no tariffs and a bias of unity. See 
Sung (1979) and Lin, Mok, and Ho (1980) for details. 193  Notes to Pages 46-63 
22.  In part this may have been because the growth in export earnings reflects almost 
entirely the fact that the price of  copper was in a slump in 1960 and rose throughout the 
decade. 
23.  Among import substitution countries covered in the project,  Brazil before 1968, 
Chile, Colombia before 1967, Tunisia, and Uruguay have all had such episodes (as did 
Argentina). 
24.  See Krueger (1978) for a fuller discussion. 
25.  Balassa (1978a, p. 45) makes much of  this point. He cites incremental capital/output 
ratios for the period 1960-73  of  1.76 for Singapore, 2.10 for South Korea, and 2.44 for 
Taiwan and contrasts them with corresponding ratios of 5.49 for Chile and 5.72 for India. 
26.  See chapter 4 for reasons why that might be expected. 
Chapter 4 
1. Note that, even with factor intensity reversals, all industries would employ more 
labor-intensive techniques at a lower wagelrental ratio under any efficient allocation. This 
implication would  be useful  empirically were it not for the impossibility of  identifying 
homogeneous factors across countries. 
2. For a given price set, it can never be more profitable to produce three commodities 
than two. This is what makes the composition of  output indeterminate. 
3.  In the context of  a multicommodity model, specialization takes on a different mean- 
ing from the one it has in two-commodity models. In the latter, specialization implies a 
positive production level for only one commodity. With many commodities, specialization 
means the failure to produce at least as many commodities in common as  there are factors of 
production. 
4. If  commodity prices were truly imposed at random, it would be highly improbable 
that either country would have positive production levels for more than a few goods (and 
there is no assurance whatever that the commodities at either factor intensity extreme would 
be produced at all). In reality, prices are determined in the market and are related  to 
production costs ,via supply and demand: at  the wagekental ratio associated with a particular 
commodity’s production, there are prices at which other commodities can also be produced 
at competitive equilibrium; if the factor demands derived from the output mix demanded at 
those prices are not equal to factor supplies, the wagekental ratio can adjust as commodity 
prices alter. 
5. The empirical likelihood of  such an outcome is open to question, especially if one 
takes into account transport costs. A simple proof that it could happen in the model set forth 
above is as follows. If the wagelrental ratio were lower in country 8 than in country 9, then 
commodity 6 would be cheaper to produce in country 8 than in country 9 at prevailing factor 
prices and the competitive profit conditions would not be met. Therefore the wagehental 
ratios in countries 8 and 9 must be the same. The reverse reasoning can then be used 
between countries 7 and 8, as a higher wagelrental ratio in 8 than in 7 would imply that 
commodity 5 could not be competitively produced (see Bhagwati 1972 for a fuller discus- 
sion). 
6. Whether an industry is an import substitute or an export is simply a matter of  the 
precise nature of  the factor endowment relative to other countries and, of  course, demand 
conditions. Consider, for example, country 1 in figure 4.1. It must export commodity 1 and 
may export commodity 2, depending on whether production is greater or  less than domestic 
demand. It  could, however, be using virtually all its resources in the production of commod- 
ity 1, so that demand for commodity 2 exceeded domestic production. In that case commod- 
ity 1 would be exported and commodities 2 through n imported. 
7. In effect, this is the “small country” assumption, and it could not be valid indefinitely, 
since continued growth, with the rest of the world of  constant size, would eventually make 
the country in question very large. Many of  the statements in this section can, however, be 
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relative to labor at a common rate and the country in question is growing more rapidly. 
Formal extension of  the model to that case is difficult and is not attempted here. The 
problem lies in the fact that, as shown by the Rybczynski theorem (Rybczynski 1955), if  a 
country is producing two commodities and its capital/labor endowment increases, output of 
the capital-intensive commodity must increase more rapidly than the proportional change in 
the capital stock, while output of the labor-intensive commodity must change less than the 
percentage change in the quantity of labor (so  that, if  there was no change in the quantity of 
labor, output of the labor-intensive commodity would have to decrease). An attempt to 
describe growth of  the world economy would therefore require consideration of  demand 
conditions, since price changes would surely have to be explicitly incorporated into the 
model. 
8. It could happen that production of  one commodity ceased simultaneously with the 
start of the other. In that event there would be no period with a constant wagelrental ratio. 
9.  It is shown below that introducing transport  costs probably smooths the stepwise 
progression described here. 
10. Strictly speaking, the assumptions made are insufficient, if the labor force is growing, 
to ensure such  an outcome: output  of  the more labor-intensive  commodity  could  be 
growing, but at a slower rate than the growth of  the labor force. This is where the “small 
country” assumption becomes inadequate. 
11.  A necessary condition for the validity of the assertion is that food is a normal good. 
12. Strictly speaking, this statement is valid only if  it is assumed that there is no upper 
limit to the marginal product of  labor in agriculture. 
13. If there is “disguised unemployment” in the rural sector, so that workers leave at 
some fixed wage as urban jobs become available, the real wage would remain constant for a 
greater interval of  capital accumulation and output would increase more rapidly in the 
urban sector. The composition of  output would not start changing until the urban real wage 
began rising. See chapter 2 for a discussion of the issues involved in identifying the nature of 
the urban labor supply, and see also Sen (1975). 
14.  Once import-competing production is adequate to satisfy the domestic market, the 
domestic,price of  the good is free to vary within the range determined by transport costs. It 
could even be less than the international  price, but by an amount insufficient to enable 
exports with competitive profit levels. Thus the domestic price of  exportables  must be 
exactly equal to their international price less transport costs; the domestic price of  import- 
ables can be anywhere from the international price less transport costs to the international 
price plus transport costs. It must exactly equal the latter only when imports and domestic 
production  are both sold in the domestic market. 
15. For a summary of  the basic theorems of  the HOS model when home goods are 
present, see Batra (1973, chap.  12). 
16.  Likewise, if it were assumed that production of home goods required only labor as an 
input, the analysis wouldnot be affected. Note that intermediate goods also do not affect the 
analysis insofar as they are all tradable; when they are home goods, the complications 
discussed above arise. 
17. This  follows because  labor-abundant  manufacturing sectors will  need  less of  a 
transport-cost barrier to enable their firms to compete with the labor-intensive commod- 
ities. 
18. But see the interesting paper by Hufbauer and Chilas (1975), who attempted to 
estimate the effect of  protection on the extent of  specialization among the Western Euro- 
pean countries compared with regions of the United States: the authors found that Amer- 
ican regions were more specialized than comparable European countries, thus providing 
another piece of indirect evidence in support of the view that specialization patterns and not 
comparison  of  import-competing  and export  coefficients are the appropriate forms for 
empirical work. 
19. To attempt to formalize an n-country model in which there are distortions in more 
than one country is an incredibly complex task that will not be attempted here. 195  Notes to Pages 7>79 
20. Travis (1964) has expounded the position that it is trade impediments that prevent 
21.  See chapter 5 for a discussion of  these measures in the project countries. 
22. As is evidenced in chapter 8, this probably occurred in some of the project countries. 
23.  Intermediate goods have not been explicitly dealt with here. If  they were, then it 
would be effective rates of  protection that should be correlated with capital intensity. 
24.  For the most capital-abundant country, protection rates should be positively corre- 
lated with the labor intensity of the industry. For countries in the middle, one would have to 
partition commodities into those more capital intensive and those less capital intensive than 
the manufacturing sector’s factor endowment. The hypothesis is that the height of  protec- 
tion needed to induce domestic production is positively correlated with labor intensity for 
the commodities on that side of  the sector’s endowment, and positively correlated  with 
capital intensity for commodities on the other side. 
25.  The presence  of  protection,  which  would  induce  production  in  more capital- 
intensive industries than would occur under an efficient protection pattern, increases the 
likelihood that there would be greater capital intensity in the import-competing commod- 
ities than  in  export industries.  This  result  holds  only for  the countries  with  extreme 
manufacturing endowments, however. 
26.  Of course one would have to use the appropriate protection measure, including the 
tariff equivalents of quotas and the subsidy equivalents of  credits and the like and omitting 
all tariff  redundancy. In addition, appropriate measures of  capital and labor would,  as 
always, be necessary. 
27.  Strictly speaking, if  factor markets are distorted, the price of home goods will in 
general diverge from that which would prevail under competition in all markets. It must 
therefore be assumed in this section that there are no home goods. Since transport costs do 
not  affect the results, because international  prices are assumed given, they too will be 
assumed absent. The world under discussion is therefore one in which there are n  manufac- 
tured goods and food, with all prices given to the country under consideration  by  the 
international market. There are, as before, three domestic factors: land, which is always 
fully employed in agriculture; capital, which is always fully employed in manufacturing; and 
labor, which is used in both sectors. It will be seen that there are a number of  possible 
distortions,  each of  which can be characterized by a set of  conditions on the wage and 
employment of labor. Full employment may or may not be assumed, and the wage may or 
may not be common between agriculture and manufacturing or within manufacturing. 
28.  Of course, if one knew the subsidy and tax equivalents of these measures, they could 
then be treated as protective rates, and empirical work could proceed in the same manner as 
described for the commodity market distortions. 
29.  If  one regards the “real wage floor” as applying only to the manufacturing sector, the 
case merges with the full employment, constant differential case discussed next. 
30.  A difficulty with this interpretation is that there are generally some commodities, 
such as textiles, produced in both sectors. 
31.  Recall that it is assumed initially that domestic prices equal international prices. The 
effects of  introducing tariffs in the context of  the factor market distortion are examined 
below. 
32.  If  a labor-abundant country did specialize in producing the capital-intensive good 
and was on its transformation  curve (at D in figure 4.2a), it would be using more labor- 
intensive techniques of production than other countries whose “true” comparative advan- 
tage lay in producing that commodity. It should be stressed again that this could happen only 
if the distortion-ridden  country somehow managed to increase the relative price of  the 
capital-intensive commodity enough to make production profitable at a high real wage with 
labor-intensive techniques of production. One can doubt whether there are many instances 
of  wrong specialization and full employment. 
33.  That employment (and output) in agriculture will fall follows immediately from the 
fact that the real wage increases from its distortion-free level. 
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34.  This can be seen most easily by  thinking of  the “dual”  of  the undistorted  case. 
Consider the wage rate that would prevail with complete specialization in commodity 1. Let 
the wage rise to the point where it pays to produce commodities 1 and 2, that is, to the 
wagehental ratio implied by the prices of  the first two commodities. Then production of 
both commodities will be profitable, and, with total capital stock the same, employment 
must be smaller. Let the wage increase a little more. Now production only of commodity 2 
will be profitable; as the real wage rises (for a given price of  output and capital stock), 
employment in the second industry will be smaller. At some point the wage will be that 
implied by the prices of goods 2 and 3, and production of both will be profitable, and so on. It 
should also be noted that the value of  production of manufactured goods, evaluated at 
international prices, will decrease with increase in the real wage. 
35.  The straightforward definition of  “labor intensive”  in this context is clearly that 
more hours of  labor are employed per unit of international value added in one sector than in 
the other. 
36.  If  agriculture is labor intensive relative to industry, and the real wage is higher in 
industry, the reversal could never happen in physical terms, although it might be that labor’s 
share became higher in industry than in agriculture. 
37.  If  the wage differential were between  all manufacturing, on the one hand, and 
agriculture, on the other, the analysis would be the same as for the Harris-Todaro case. 
38.  For a survey of the literature, see Magee (1973). Corden (1974. chap. 5)  has a good 
exposition of the basic model and its implications. 
39.  I am indebted to Stephen Magee, who called this representation to my attention. 
40.  Note that the relative price  of  the labor-intensive  commodity must  increase or 
production would simply become completely specialized. 
41.  It should be stressed that this result could not be observed unless the relative price of 
the commodity was above the level that would prevail at free trade. If, for example, textiles 
are the “efficient” export for a particular country and are observed to be capital intensive 
relative to other produced commodities, one could rule out the proposition that they were 
naturally labor intensive unless their relative price was higher domestically than in interna- 
tional markets. This could happen, of  course, but it would require subsidization of exports 
and factor market distortion so that the wagehental ratio facing the export industry was 
higher than that facing the other industry. 
42.  One could presumably test whether there had been a reversal of  the factor intensities 
in response to the differential by contrasting the factor-intensity ordering of  the country 
with that of other countries thought to be unaffected by the distortion. 
43.  See note 42, which also applies here. 
Chapter 5 
1. Some of  the Latin American country authors believed that the T, statistic did not 
adequately discriminate between competing and noncompeting imports, because prohibi- 
tions against imports of  anything produced  domestically implied that all goods actually 
imported were noncompeting. 
2. Yun Wing Sung (1979) found  that for Hong Kong the  Tis had  a highly skewed 
distribution. He  therefore transformed the statistic into a related one of (Pi -  Ci)/Pi.  With 
the benefit of hindsight, it might have been preferable to use the latter statistic throughout, 
though it is not evident that it affected the results of  the individual country studies. 
3.  See below for a discussion of  the shift in Brazil’s trade composition. 
4.  Look at table 3.3 to see the prevalence of  this phenomenon. 
5. In principle, a country could have a sufficiently distorted incentive system for exports 
so that some commodities were exported that would not be economic at free trade, and one 
could have a category of “protected” exportables. This did not arise in practice in any of the 
country studies, although some country authors did break down exports into “more pro- 
tected”  and “less protected.” 197  Notes to Pages 92-100 
6. There are also problems associated with estimating the factor proportions that would 
probably be used in the development of new import substitution industries. See chapter 1  of 
Krueger et al. (1981) for a discussion of that issue. 
7.  See Learner (1980) for a discussion of the appropriate test of a country’s relative factor 
abundance in this case. 
8. This is because,  under balanced  trade “gross exports,”  that is,  the  value added 
domestically plus the value of  imported inputs used in production of  exports (not export- 
ables), equal “gross imports,” that is, imports used in domestic consumption plus imports 
used in production of goods for export. Likewise, “net” exports (gross exports less the value 
of  imports  reexported)  equal  “net”  imports  (gross imports  less the value of  imports 
reexported). With imbalanced trade, the difficulty  lies in the fact that gross, not net, exports 
are observed. 
9.  For a full exposition of this procedure and its rationale see chapter 1 of the first volume 
in this series (Krueger et al. 1981). 
10. This discussion assumes that a single factor price prevails throughout the country’s 
economy. The existence of factor market distortions in the sense of different factor prices 
confronting producers in different sectors is taken up in chapters 7 and 8. 
11. Recall that in some  instances the availability of a domestically produced raw material 
was judged  to be a significant determinant of  comparative advantage  for a particular 
manufacturing sector.  See section 5.1.2. 
12. The absolute numbers are telling in this regard. Monson’s (1981) estimates of total 
labor coefficients indicate that 2,488 man-hours of  labor are used for modern-sector HOS 
exportable production  per million FCFA of  domestic value added. This compares with 
19,933 man-hours for NRB exports. That NRB exports predominate is reflected by the fact 
that the average over NRB and HOS exports is 18,993 man-hours per million FCFA of 
DVA  . 
13. Pulp and paper exports are destined primarily for Chile’s LAFTA trading partners; 
see section 6.2 below. 
14. If  the Tunisian figure is recomputed to include oil among NRB exports, the Tunisian 
NRB exports becpme an exception to the statement above. 
15. Westphal and Kim (1977) also based their estimates on output, not on value added. 
Laborkapital ratios derived that way are not biased, and it is therefore those ratios that are 
reported in table 5.2. 
16. For 1968 Westphal and Kim estimate that the laborkapital ratio in primary exports 
was 5.69, compared with 15.48 for primary imports. That contrasts with laborkapital ratios 
of  3.55 for manufactured exports and 2.33 for manufactured import-competing goods. See 
Westphal and Kim (1977, table VII-10). 
17.  In correspondence,  Hong offered  an index of  labor  intensity of  South Korean 
domestic output and exportables with 1960 = 100. According to these data, labor intensity 
behaved as follows: 
1963  1966  1968  1970  1973  1975 
Domestic output  1.OOO  S53  .610  .500  .382  ,333 
Exportables  1.026  ,884  ,873  ,670  ,460  ,263 
This pattern is generally consistent with the Westphal-Kim findings. By 1975, subsidies to 
using capital were an important component of  the export incentive system. See Hong’s 
discussion in Krueger et al. (1981). 
18. Thoumi was unable to obtain data to provide estimates comparable to those in table 
5.1 for direct-plus-home-goods-indirect labor coefficients. He did, however, calculate the 
increase in output, value added, and wages and salaries that would result from one peso of 
direct value added. Import-competing industries had the biggest effect on all three. He 
indicated  the  reasons  for this result:  “The  import-competing  branches  of  Colombian 
manufacturing include the heaviest (most capital-intensive) industries in the country. These 
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tion costs for their inputs are the highest. The high capital intensity also results in higher 
banking and insurance inputs” (Thoumi 1981, p. 158). 
19. Sung  (1979, table 5.9a).  As a  check  on his  results,  Sung made  a comparable 
calculation for the apparel sector. He estimated a depreciation/labor ratio for the United 
States of  11.1, compared with 0.9 for Hong Kong. 
20.  The corresponding  figures for  1962, in  1973 prices,  are: 684 for noncompeting 
imports, 346 for import-competing production, and 296  for exportable production.  See 
Sung (1979, table 5.11). 
21.  Recall that Hong did not correct for differences in value added/output ratios, so 
capital/labor ratios must be used to generate meaningful results. 
22.  Thoumi’s work contains an estimate of  the factor content of  “noncompeting im- 
ports,”  but that estimate  is derived from domestic coefficients. Those coefficients are 
derived from the subsectors represented domestically, which presumably are different from 
the noncompeting import subsectors for which an estimate of  factor inputs is desired. 
Chapter 6 
1. See the Corbo and Meller (1982) results on this point, and also Branson and Monoyios 
(1977). 
2.  See chapter 7 for a discussion of  optimal factor proportions  and skill/capital/labor 
substitutability. 
3.  See Paul Schultz’s study in Trade and Employment in Developing Countries, vol. 2, 
Factor  Supply and Substitution (Krueger 1982), discussed in chapters 7 and 8 below. 
Schultz’s finding, that part of effective protection shows up in higher earnings to persons in 
the protected industry, strongly suggests that the Carvalho-Haddad procedure is preferable 
to using mean earnings when the necessary data are available. 
4.  Nogues reported that 72 percent of  all Argentine exports to LAFTA were import- 
competing. Further, these exports were the least labor intensive of all Argentina’s exports. 
5. However, the ordering of capital/labor ratios remains unchanged. 
6.  For ihcomplete specialization, there must be at least one set of factor prices at which 
both commodities could be profitably produced for a given set of  world prices. Since figure 
6.2 is drawn with the factor prices and world prices indicated, it would not be possible for 
every country to face common production functions in each industry and simultaneously 
produce both commodities. 
7.  Although figures 6.1 and 6.2 both represent “reversals” from L/DVA to L/IVA, they 
differ fundamentally  in  that in figure 6.1 there is a set of  factor prices  (and therefore 
endowments)  at which it would pay both industries to produce, whereas in figure 6.2 it 
would never pay to operate industry B at any positive level as long as international prices 
remained as depicted. In the latter case,  if  some other country were  producing both 
commodities without protection, it would be presumptive evidence of differences in produc- 
tion functions between countries. 
8. Not all country authors computed the IVA statistics. Countries covered in the project 
and not listed in the table are countries for which the data were not available. For Hong 
Kong, of course, DVA and IVA coefficients are identical and are not reproduced here. 
9.  It should  be noted  that  L/IVA is undefined  when  international  value  added  is 
negative. 
Chapter 7 
1. In principle, one should also consider the ways the choice of  trade regimes affects 
labor costs. However, it is difficult to pinpoint mechanisms through which such an effect 199  Notes to Pages 121-29 
might arise; some have suggested that multinational corporations may pay different wages 
than do  domestic firms, but, quite aside from the fact that this cohld happen under any type 
of  labor regime,  it is not evident  how the practice would  affect relative costs of  labor 
between  industries.  It is also possible that imported  capital equipment might generate 
demand for a different type of  labor than does domestically produced capital equipment, 
but that would affect the domestic labor market through distortions under the trade regime 
induced by its treatment of  imports of capital goods. There is no evidence on these points 
available from the country studies and little basis for believing that these or other mecha- 
nisms are quantitatively significant. 
2.  Some export promotion strategies, including notably that of  South Korea, have been 
implemented  in part by providing exporters with preferential access to credit. Generally 
such access is valuable precisely because there is credit rationing. The  effects of preferential 
access are therefore discussed below in connection with domestic capital market imperfec- 
tions. 
3.  If  domestic consumption was smaller, it would be either because imports of consumer 
goods were less than they would be at  equilibrium (because of their higher price) or because 
exports of consumer goods were greater than they would otherwise be. This latter possibility 
could occur only if the effective exchange rate for exportables lay above that for import of 
capital equipment (and above its equilibrium rate in a unified exchange rate system). 
4. The transfer would be from exporters receiving fewer units of domestic currency per 
unit of foreign exchange that they would at equilibrium to import-license recipients. 
5. If  all applicants know that licenses will be granted in proportion  7~ to the amount 
applied for, all applicants will apply for 1/7~  times their desired quantity of imports, and the 
rationing mechanisms will be ineffective. To be sure, if  there is excess demand for foreign 
exchange, the actual proportion will be less than 71. 
6. Ghana, India, the Philippines, and Turkey also had this set of incentives surrounding 
the industrial sector, as was documented in the NBER project on foreign trade regimes and 
economic development. 
7. South Korea has in recent years begun contracting to erect large projects in foreign 
countries, notably in the Middle East, so that construction need not be a home good. In the 
import substitutidn countries, however, it seems sensible to so regard it. 
8.  See, for example, McCabe and Michalopoulos (1971). Nogues (1980) also deals with 
this question for Argentina. See section 7.2.1. 
9. For an interesting case study, see Rhee and Westphal (1977). 
10. Whether domestic construction represents a viable substitute for imported machin- 
ery and equipment is more problematic.  There is some evidence  that the  fraction of 
construction in total investment rises during periods of extreme restrictiveness of  import 
substitution regimes. However, that phenomenon appears to reflect a diversion of invest- 
ment away from the industrial and commercial sectors and toward residential construction. 
See Krueger (1978, pp. 252-57)  for a discussion. 
11. For an exposition of  the view that capital market imperfections are a crucial distor- 
tion in LCDs, see McKinnon (1973). 
12. Because of  “moral hazard” and other uncertainties, it may be rational behavior for 
banks to determine interest rates and give borrowers less credit than they would wish at 
those rates. The “moral hazard”  and uncertainty argument for credit rationing has been 
spelled out by Jaffee and Russell (1976). The  credit rationing and negative real interest rates 
discussed here refer to far more extreme circumstances, in which financial institutions would 
charge  higher  rates for loans  if  permitted to do so  (and  would  sometimes  do so by 
under-the-table payments, requiring large minimum balances during the period when loans 
are outstanding or when other conditions effectively increase the cost of borrowing). 
13. For a survey of  the rationales  for these practices,  see Katkhate and Villaneuva 
(1978). 
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in a context in which cash wages might be higher in the nontaxed sector (to compensate for 
the absence of  those benefits). 
15.  Indeed, it is an interesting question, but one on which the country studies did not 
shed any light, whether  multinational corporations may not use more capital-intensive 
techniques than their local counterparts precisely because they are induced to locate in the 
country by tax holidays and exemptions not granted to their local counterparts. Although 
Lipsey, Kravis, and Roldan (1982) show that use of more capital-intensive techniques is far 
less widespread than often stated, they could not obtain data on differentials in incentives 
for domestically owned and foreign capital. 
16. It should not be forgotten that the structure of  protection constitutes a distortion in 
the product market. The  effect of differentiated tariffs on factor use is considered in chapter 
8, along with the effect of  the factor market distortions discussed here. 
17. The conclusions stated above are those of  Carvalho and Haddad, and also of  most 
knowledgeable analysts of the Brazilian economy. It is an unexplained puzzle, therefore, 
that the index of  the price of  capital equipment in Brazil rose less rapidly than either the 
nominal wage or the wholesale price index. Carvalho and Haddad indicate that, from 1955 
to 1974, real wages rose 80 percent, while the nominal price of capital goods rose by less than 
half the incl‘ease in the wholesale price index. See Carvalho and Haddad (1981, pp. 59 ff.). 
18. There is, however,  evidence that investment decisions by  individual firms were 
heavily influenced by foreign exchange availability. See the interesting results reported by 
Bilsborrow (1977). 
19. But see Schultz’s analysis of  the effect of  the trade regime on earnings in Krueger 
(1982). 
20.  Data are from Monson (1981), table 6.14. 
21.  Data are from Monson (1981), table 6.15. 
22. This assumption vastly simplifies analysis, since otherwise  the value of  a credit 
subsidy hinges upon the tax rate and the value of  a tax break hinges upon the fraction 
interest payments constitute of  sales revenue less other costs. When interest payments are 
subject to tax, the incremental value of  either a lower tax rate or an interest subsidy is 
reduced. 
23.  Hdwever, the average rate of  duty collection in Korea has not been very high-duty 
collections were only 9 percent of imports in 1970. The duty-free provisions were changed to 
a delayed-payment arrangement after 1974. 
24.  Among the measures taken during the period of transition from import substitution 
to export promotion  in  Korea  was a fairly thoroughgoing  financial reform  that raised 
nominal interest rates and also lowered the rate of  inflation. By the 1970s, however, real 
interest rates fell sharply. 
25.  This assumes that the won was not devalued during the period of the loan. For an 
analysis of  the effects of  this distortion, see Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1975, chap. 9). 
26.  A possible exception is Uruguay, but there are not enough data available to judge. 
27.  Of course, to the extent that different firms or industries had differential access to 
credit  or other privileges,  that  access affected  their  demand  for capital goods.  Since 
domestic credit market imperfections seem to have been of  considerable importance in 
Tunisia, the statement that all comers had access to imports at the same price is somewhat 
misleading. See the discussion in Nabli (1981, sec. 10.1.4). 
28.  Hong Kong is an exception. It is arguable whether Brazil’s BNDE loans constitute 
credit rationing. And the evidence is simply not available for Chile or Colombia. 
29.  See, for example, Magee (1976, p. 45). 
30. If  the minimum wage is set at above equilibrium level and employers are induced to 
hire more skilled, and fewer unskilled, workers than they otherwise would, the resulting 
“shortage” of  skilled workers will be greater than would have resulted had the wage rate for 
unskilled workers not been constrained.  In those circumstances the actual wage paid to 201  Notes to Pages 154-73 
skilled workers would generally be expected to be higher than it would be in the absence of 
the minimum wage constraint. 
Chapter 8 
1. Focus throughout the project  has been  on the link between trade strategies and 
employment  under efficient allocation of  resources. Thus, attention is on  ways existing 
trade strategies might have been implemented consistent with greater labor utilization at a 
positive marginal product and no less international value added. 
2. See section 3.1.2 for a definition of  the effective rates of protection (ERPs). 
3.  Note that these data are based on  a different set of  estimates than those reported in 
table 8.1. See Nabli (1981) for a discussion of  the difference between the two sets. 
4. See section 5.1.2  for a discussion of  the relation between Tis and EMS. 
5. In the Brazilian case the implications are even stronger. Based on 1970 employment 
coefficients, the data indicate that employment per million cruzeiros of  exports and import- 
competing products was 11.2 and 16.3 in 1959, contrasted with 16.1 and 15.9 in 1968 and 
20.5 and 14.4 in 1974. Thus, observed factor intensities in fact reversed. 
6. For purposes of  evaluating potential in table 8.10, Monson’s estimated labor coef- 
ficient for DC  importables with below-average protection was contrasted with the average 
for all DC importables. 
7. On an earlier draft of this chapter, one reader raised the question whether the output 
of the large- and small-scale firms is the same. There is no ready answer to the question, but 
it is difficult to believe that the systematic pattern seen across all industries reflects only 
differences in output composition within each industry. 
8.  There may also be factors associated with the choice of  trade regime that influence 
size of  firm regardless of  trade category. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro  found, for example, that in 
Colombia import licenses tended to be granted more readily to larger firms (see Diaz- 
Alejandro 1976, pp. 139ff.). Insofar as licensing procedures, access to foreign exchange, 
and fixed costs #of paperwork  bias the allocation  of  licenses to larger firms, an import 
substitution regime may affect the overall size distribution of  firms. 
9. See section  8.3.2 for a  comparison across countries.  Comparison  of  mean g,s  is 
somewhat hazardous when the degree of disaggregation differs significantly. But when, as in 
Korea, the sectoral breakdown remains constant over the set of observations, the reliability 
of  mean g,  as a measure of  efficiency of  resource allocation is considerably greater. 
10. It is also of  interest  to examine the gjs associated with different sectors and the 
changes in them over time. The g for cotton yam, for example, was .37 in both 1966 and 
1970. Exports of  that commodity were growing rapidly during the period 196670. By 1973, 
g fell to .03, suggesting that the profitability  of  further expansion of  that activity had 
diminished sharply. A similar pattern prevailed for most other textile activities. By contrast, 
items such as electrical products and motor vehicles, both of which had sizable negative g’s 
in the 1960s,  showed much higher g’s in 1973, thus reflecting the shift that was taking place in 
South Korean comparative advantage. 
11. Data are from Bension and Caumont (1981, tables 11.10 and 11.11). 
12. Recall from chapter 7 that Carvalho and Haddad believe minimum wage legislation 
was binding only for a very small fraction of  workers by the late 1960s. 
13. The  proportionate increase in each sector differs both because the estimated elastici- 
ties of substitution are sector-specific and because the percentage of  social insurance taxes 
levied on workers in different sectors varied somewhat. See Carvalho and Haddad (1981) 
for details. 
14. It may also be noteworthy that the average proportionate change in labor coefficient 
of the capital-intensive goods seems  to be somewhat greater than that of the labor-intensive 202  Notes to Pages 173-87 
goods. This suggests that the distortions may have worked to increase the observed capital 
intensity of import-competing industries relative to that of  exportables. 
15. See Corbo and Meller (1981, Appendix A), for details. 
16. Skill coefficients appear unaffected relative to unskilled labor. The reason for this is 
that Corbo and Meller held the relative price of skilled and unskilled labor constant in their 
simulation. Since most industries were estimated to have Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tions, no change in the ratio of  skilled to unskilled labor could have been expected. 
17. Note that the 4’s are defined as output per worker. The estimates in table 8.7 refer to 
possible increases in labor units per unit of  value added. They thus refer to the inverse of  the 
18. This assumes, of  course, that the existing strategy is somehow amended to remove 
19. Thailand and Uruguay are omitted from the table for lack of  quantitative estimates. 
20.  He also implemented the model for Kenya, Taiwan, and Turkey. Those results are 
not reviewed here, since interpretation  would require considerable background on those 
countries. The results are presented in Henderson (1982). 
21.  Constrained  optimization means that limits are placed on the change from base 
period  output values that can occur. These limits are in addition to the usual resource 
availability and balance constraints. 
22.  Strictly speaking, the shadow prices attaching to the output limits reflect the gain in 
international value added that would result from relaxing the capacity constraint (either 
upward or downward) by a unit. Although both upper- and lower-bound output limits are 
placed on each activity, only one will have a nonzero shadow price in any solution. A large 
positive shadow price on  an upper-bound constraint indicates that additional capacity would 
permit  a corresponding increase in international  value added. A smaller shadow price 
indicates less potential gain. Negative shadow prices on lower-bound constraints reflect the 
gain to be had by shifting resources to alternative, more efficient, activities. 
23.  The force of  this  qualification  can  be seen by  noting  that, even  for the West 
European countries included in Henderson’s analysis, the capacity constraints were reached 
in many sectors. Indeed, it is aproperty of the model that there will be few (usually only one) 
marginal sectors in which neither the upper- nor the lower-bound constraint is binding. 
24.  In the Henderson model there is no way of  ascertaining the extent to which the 
estimated increase in IVA orginates in factor reallocation as marginal rates of  substitution 
between factors are equated across activities rather than in output reallocation at existing 
factor proportions. Inspection of the magnitude of  the output shifts, compared with the 
relatively smaller magnitude of  the realignment of factor proportions,  suggests that the 
increased IVA probably originated more from changing outputs than from realigning factor 
proportions. But without further work it is impossible to verify this conjecture. 
4’s. 
the bias toward choice of  capital-intensive techniques for eligible firms. 
Chapter 9 
1. To be sure, there are short-run considerations pertaining to the behavior of  income 
and employment during the transition from one factor market and trade regime to another. 
Questions  pertaining  to the transition were not  addressed in the project. See Krueger 
(1978), especially chapters 11 and 12, for a discussion of these issues. 
2.  In particular, there is considerable evidence that many of the middle-income develop- 
ing countries persist in protecting their highly labor-intensive industries, such as textiles and 
footwear, in which they may have lost comparative advantage. Monson’s findings for the 
Ivory Coast and Nogues’s conclusions for Argentina  are particularly  compelling in this 
regard. 